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  ABSTRACT 
 
The vital role of forests in limiting the likelihood of dangerous climate change has 
precipitated renewed interest in debt-for-nature swaps. This article uses evidence on past debt-
for-nature  swaps  and  similar  debt  mechanisms  to  assess  the  recent  second  wave  of  debt 
swaps. It outlines five typical shortcomings of this form of financial transaction: that they often 
fail to deliver additional resources to the debtor country; often fail to deliver more resources for 
conservation/climate purposes; often have a negligible effect on overall debt burdens, and, as 
such, do not generate more ‘indirect’ benefits; and are often in conflict with the new aid delivery 
paradigm’s emphasis on alignment with government policy and systems. Our analysis is applied 
to a recent debt-for-nature swap initiative between the United States and Indonesia. We show 
that this case, which we consider as a litmus test for current swap practice, performs unevenly 
across the five shortcomings identified. On the one hand, the swap does not create additional 
resources  for  the  Government  of  Indonesia,  is  too  insignificant  to  create  indirect  (positive) 
economic  effects,  and  appears  at  odds  with  the  new  aid  delivery  paradigm’s  insistence  on 
system  alignment.  On  the  other  hand,  the  swap  does  not  reduce  Government  of  Indonesia 
resources,  and  is  very  much  in  line  with  current  national  policy.  The  extent  to  which  the 
resources provided by the swap are additional to other donor support and reserved domestic 
budget lines for conservation goals is unclear. Whilst a second generation of debt-for-nature 
swaps should clearly be avoided, there is a need to debate broader ways of linking debt service 
repayments to forest conservation. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Forest ecosystems play a vital dual function in limiting the likelihood of dangerous 
climatic change. On the one hand, they act as carbon sinks which store twice the amount of 
carbon present in the atmosphere. On the other hand, each year they actively remove up to one 
third of all carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion and land use change (McMullen 
and Jabbour, 2009). Forests’ vital role in maintaining the globe’s carbon cycle can be supported 
in a number of ways. For example, through reforestation initiatives, by increasing the amount of 
carbon  stored  and  sequestered  per  hectare  (in  other  words,  increasing  a  forest’s  carbon 
density), and through utilising sustainably-harvested forest products in place of items with a 
large carbon footprint (e.g. using timber instead of concrete for house construction) (McMullen 
and  Jabbour,  2009).  Most  importantly,  forests’  vital  role  can  be  supported  through  reducing 
deforestation  (see  e.g.  Rudel,  2001).  Estimates  suggest  that  around  one  fifth  of  global 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  stem  from  tropical  deforestation  (see  IPCC,  2007),  concentrated 
particularly  in  Indonesia  and  Brazil  (see  Porrúra  et  al.,  2007).  Moreover,  it  is  important  to 
remember that forests are more than just the carbon they store and sequester. They are integral 
to  the  globe’s  hydrological  cycle,  and  house  the  greatest  concentration  of  biodiversity  (see 
Obereke and Dooley, 2009). 
 
Despite the centrality of forest ecosystems in the global carbon cycle, until recently 
forests have been excluded from agreements under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). There have been two inter-related main reasons for this: first, a 
lack of sufficient precision and scientific agreement on measuring carbon sequestration in land 
use, land-use change and forestry; and second, that mitigation interventions within the forestry 
(or agricultural) sectors are highly dependent on the local environmental context (as the amount 
of  carbon  sequestered  in  the  soil  depends  on  climatic  zone,  local  climatic  condition, 
characteristics  of  the  soil,  type  of  vegetation,  and  cultivation  or  harvesting  practices  –  see 
Muller, 2009). As progress has been made on both these fronts, and the need for mitigation has 
become all the more pressing, recent years have seen a vibrant debate on how to integrate 
REDD-plus (in other words, reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and 
the conservation and sustainable management of existing forest carbon stocks) into a global 
climate regime (see e.g. Angelsen et al., 2009; Ebeling and Yasue, 2008; Karsenty, 2008; and 
Neeff and Ascui, 2009). For example, the 15
th Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC saw calls 
for the ‘immediate establishment’ of a mechanism to reduce emission from deforestation and 
forest  degradation  (including  REDD-plus)  as  part  of  the  Copenhagen  Accord  (UNFCCC, 
2009a). In addition, the Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
outlined the steps developing countries will be assisted with to make a REDD-plus mechanism 
operational, including: the identification of the drivers of deforestation; and estimating the levels 
of forest carbon emissions and sinks through a combination of remote sensing and ground-
based measurement (UNFCCC, 2009b).  
 
However, how to finance reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation is 
still a matter of debate. Recent estimates suggest that preparing and implementing REDD to 
ensure a 50% reduction in forest emissions will be between US$15 and 35 billion per  year 
(Angelsen  et  al.,  2009).  The  extent  to  which  these  funds  will  be  generated  from  existing 
multilateral climate funds (such as the Global Environment Facilities’ Trust Fund or the World 
Bank’s  Strategic  Climate  Fund),  current  market-based  schemes  (such  as  the  Clean 
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, or the European Emission Union Trading  
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Scheme) or innovative climate finance channels (such as a levy on emissions from international 
shipping  and  aviation,  or  the  international  or  domestic  auction  of  a  proportion  of  assigned 
amount  units)  is  yet  to  be  finalised.  For  example,  the  Copenhagen  Accord  only  states  that 
countries  ‘decide  to  pursue  various  approaches,  including  opportunities  to  use  markets,  to 
enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions’ (UNFCCC, 2009a). In this 
respect, it is as yet uncertain whether funding for REDD will take the ‘polluter pays principle’ 
fully  into  account  and  ensure  that  developed  countries  contributions  will  be  pursuant  with 
cumulative, per capita emissions. To be sure, as climate change mitigation (through REDD or 
other strategies) is clearly a global public good, it would seem fair that developed countries 
shoulder a larger part of the costs involved than when purely national benefits (for example in 
the education or health sector of developing countries) would be generated. 
 
This  continuous  search  for  innovative  financing  mechanisms  has  also  renewed 
interest in debt-for-nature swaps (now framed as much in terms of carbon storage as protecting 
biodiversity). Indeed, debt swaps were part of the negotiating text for the Copenhagen summit. 
Although absent from previous UNFCCC finance documents, Indonesia inserted ‘external debt 
swap/relief’  as  a  source  of  finance  during  the  UNFCCC’s  informal  consultations  in  Bonn  in 
August,  2009  (see  UNFCCC,  2009c:157).  In  such  swaps  a  non-governmental  organisation 
(NGO) purchases (commercial) developing country debt on the secondary market at a discount 
from the face value of the debt title. The NGO redeems the acquired title with the debtor country 
in  exchange  for  a  domestic  currency  instrument  used  to  finance  environmental  and 
conservation expenditures by local partners (normally receiving a redemption price closer to 
face  value  than  the  secondary  market  price)  (see  Hansen,  1989;  Jha  and  Schatan,  2001; 
Sheikh, 2008). 
 
Different variations on this swap procedure exist. Current transactions are often 
conducted directly between a creditor and a debtor government (thus involving public debt), 
usually with assistance from an international NGO.
1 On the 30
th June 2009, such a bilateral deal 
was  signed  between  the  United  States  and  Indonesia,  swapping  nearly  US$  30  million  of 
Indonesian  government  debt  owed  to  the  United  States  over  the  next  eight  years  against 
Indonesia’s  commitment  to  spend  this  sum  on  NGO  projects  benefiting  Sumatra’s  tropical 
forests. Both Conservational International and an Indonesian environmental foundation helped 
broker the deal (see USAID, 2009a; Huff, 2009). 
 
Debt  conversions  have  been  seen  as  ‘win-win-win’  transactions  (Gugler,  1997), 
being  advantageous  to  all  parties  involved  (see  e.g.  Moye,  2001).
2  From this perspective, 
                                                 
1 For example, The Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, and Conservation International have all 
been recently involved in such transactions. 
  
2 Some arguments in support of debt-for-nature swaps resemble those in the literature on  environmental 
taxation concerning the ‘double dividend hypothesis’. Here, environmental taxes are seen as an efficient 
instrument to protect the environment by, firstly, discouraging environmentally degrading activities such as, 
say, mining or deforestation. Secondly, tax revenues can be used to finance projects to the benefit of the 
environment or to cut other, possibly distortionary taxes. As such, by introducing an environmental tax, the 
government  may  reap  a  ‘double  dividend’  (see  e.g.  Goulder,  1995  and  Bovenberg,  1999  for  a  more 
detailed  account).  In  analogy,  advocates  of  debt-for-nature  swaps  have  argued  that  these  swap 
arrangements,  by  relieving  countries  from  their  foreign  exchange  (debt  service)  obligations,  help  to 
preserve the environment as the demand for natural resource extraction diminishes, while at the same 
time mobilising additional funds which can be utilised for beneficial environmental or fiscal purposes. The 
link between hard currency denoted debt reduction and lower extraction rates is however contested (see 
e.g. Didia, 2001 versus Khan and McDonald, 1995).  
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debtor countries reduce their debt burden, save scarce hard currency, and free up budgetary 
resources  for  environmental  (or  other)  spending.  Environmental  groups  leverage  their  funds 
because of a positive difference between the redemption value and the secondary market value 
of  the  debt  purchased  or  received,  raise  their  profile  and  expand  their  network.  Creditors, 
usually developed country governments or private banks, will see an increase in the value of 
any remaining debt claims and improve their environmental credentials (Occhiolini, 1990; Dogsé 
and  von  Droste,  1990).  It  is,  however,  far  from  certain  that  many  of  the  foregoing  benefits 
materialise in practice. For example, does the US-Indonesian swap deal necessarily imply that 
Indonesia will see its available resources increase by US$ 30 million, or that an extra US$ 30 
million will be spent on environmental purposes?  
 
This article uses evidence on past debt-for-nature swaps and similar debt swap 
initiatives  to  assess  the  pitfalls  and  potential  of  such  financial  instruments.  The  analysis  is 
applied to a recent debt swap between the United States and Indonesia. There are four reasons 
why we focus on this swap and consider it as a litmus test for assessing the efficacy of current 
debt-for-nature swaps. First, this  is the  largest debt swap  yet conducted under the Tropical 
Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), a key piece of legislation designed to facilitate public debt 
swaps to conserve Tropical Forests. Second, on the creditor side, the United States, through 
the TFCA, is the main exponent of debt-for-nature swaps. Third, on the debtor side, and under 
the guidance of Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Indonesia is promoting debt swaps and 
debt relief as a form of climate finance. And fourth, regarding the broker role, Conservation 
International has been at the forefront of promoting and conducting debt-for-nature swaps over 
the past two decades.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a concise history of debt swaps 
and provides details of the case under review. Section 3 discusses two direct benefits that debt-
for-nature  swaps  should  provide.  First,  on  a  recipient  country  level,  they  should  lead  to  an 
increase in available resources. Second, on a global level, they should generate extra funding 
for conservation. Section 4 focuses on an alleged indirect benefit: that reduced external debt will 
help to improve macro-economic stability, hence leading to increased domestic resources and 
aid  flows  in  the  future  as  well  as  lower  deforestation  rates.  Section  5  summarises  the 
institutional  budgetary  procedures  associated  with  debt-for-nature  swaps,  and  discusses 
whether such swaps adhere to the new aid paradigm’s insistence on alignment with government 
policy  and  systems.  Each  section  concludes  by  stating  the  extent  to  which  the  recent  US-
Indonesia  case  overcomes  the  typical  shortcomings  outlined  in  the  literature.  The  article 
concludes by suggesting that whilst a second generation of debt-for-nature swaps should be 
avoided, there is a need to debate innovative ways of linking debt service repayments to forest 
conservation.  
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2.  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS:  WHAT  ARE  THEY  AND  WHERE  DID 
THEY COME FROM? 
 
Debt-for-nature  swaps  belong  to  a  broader  category  of  debt  conversion 
programmes. Their origins can be traced to debt-for-equity exchanges triggered by the Latin 
American debt crisis in the early 1980s. The secondary market for developing country debt 
expanded rapidly at this time as lending agencies sought ways to curb losses (Thapa, 1998). 
Originating in Chile in 1985, debt-for-equity schemes allowed investors to redeem external debt 
titles, obtained at discount on the secondary market, with the debtor country in return for local 
currency to be invested as equity in national companies (Moye, 2001). The rationale was that 
debtor countries would benefit from debt relief, while foreign investors obtained stock holdings 
at preferential exchange rates (Buckley, 2009).  
 
Such  swaps  were  practiced  widely  in  the  late  1980s,  often  linked  to  the 
privatisation of public assets, and peaked in 1990 with a combined swap volume of US $27 
billion (Kaiser and Lambert, 1996).
3 However, particularly from the mid -1990s onwards, their 
popularity started to dwindle as the value of developing  country debt appreciated within the 
secondary market due to the improved stability and solvency of major economies such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (Ruiz, 2007).
4  
 
As  is  widely  acknowledged,  applying  the  concept  of  debt -for-equity  swaps  to 
environmental protection was first proposed in 1984 by Dr. Thomas Lovejoy, then vice-president 
of the World Wildlife Foundation (see Lovejoy, 1984). Conservationists like Lovejoy argued that 
the mounting pressure on highly indebted countries to service extern al debt was leading to an 
increase in primary commodity exports, often being the only source of foreign exchange in 
these economies, and this to the detriment of the environment. Debt -for-nature swaps were 
seen as a way of raising funds for combating envir onmental degradation, at the same time 
alleviating  debtor  countries’  desperate  (and  environmentally  damaging)  search  for  hard 
currency (Sheikh, 2008). The first agreement was signed between Conservation International 
and Bolivia in July 1987.
5  
 
The  Nature  Conservancy, World Wildlife  Fund  and  Conservation  International 
brokered numerous similar swaps in the following decade, mainly in Latin American countri es 
(Sheikh, 2008). Between 1987 and  1997 debt-for-nature swaps accounted for US$ 134 million 
worth of commercial developing country debt, purchased at an average discount of 78 percent, 
and US$ 126 million of local currency counterpart funds targeted to conservation (Development 
Finance International, 2009). In addition to the use of commercial debt titles , in 1991 the Paris 
Club, a forum for negotiating debt restructurings between indebted developing countries and 
official bilateral creditors, introduced a clause that allowed members to convert all official public 
                                                 
3 Their attractiveness was further aided by the liberalisation of US banking regulations (see Kaiser and 
Lambert, 1996).  
 
4  Further  reasons  include  growing  criticisms  of  the  privat isation  agenda,  growing  realisation  of  the 
inflationary character of these often large -scale transactions and their failure to draw in new additional 
investment (Buckley, 2009). 
 
5 Using a US$ 100,000 grant from the Frank Weeden Foundation, Conservation In ternational acquired 
commercial Bolivian debt with a nominal value of US$ 650,000. It redeemed this title with the Bolivian 
government in exchange for a commitment to conserve 3.7 million acres of forest, and a contribution of 
US$  100,000  worth  of  new  boli vianos  to  a  US$  250,000  fund  for  biosphere  reserve  management 
(Occhiolini, 1990).  
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debt through debt swaps with social or environmental objectives (Jha and Schatan, 2001; Ruiz, 
2007; see also Paris Club, 2009a). This led to a marked increase in debt-for-nature initiatives. 
Canada, Finland, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States were the first countries to 
make use of the Paris Club clause in the environmental sphere (see Moye, 2003). 
 
Above all, the United States has played a leading role in conducting bilateral (non-
commercial)  debt-for-nature  programmes.  A  cornerstone  of  recent  exchanges  has  been  the 
Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), passed by Congress in 1998, which expanded the 
1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) away from just Latin American and Caribbean 
countries to any developing country with tropical forests (Moye, 2001; Sheikh, 2008).
6 Despite 
the TFCA, the overall number of debt-for-nature swaps has declined since the mid-1990s. Just 
as  with  debt -for-equity  swaps,  the  appreciation  of  the  value  of  commercial  debt  titles  on 
secondary markets has made debt-for-nature swaps less attractive for environmental groups, at 
least from a financial perspective (Sheikh, 2008). Moreover, debt swaps in all their guises have 
been subject to thorough critique. They generally failed to deliver additional resources to debtor 
countries or more resources for sectoral or public goods purposes, and were conducted at an 
insufficient scale with inappropriate conditionalities (see sections 3, 4 and 5). Debt relief practice 
thus moved away from debt swaps to comprehensive and large-scale debt relief initiatives such 
as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and its successor, the Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI), with policy and system alignment (see section 5) facilitated through the 
attached Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process.
7  
 
In spite of earlier critiques, recent years have seen the re -emergence of debt 
swaps in a number of sectors. For example, debt -for-education swaps and debt -for-health 
swaps have been pursued (see OEI, 2006 and Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria,  2007, respectively) and critiqued (see Cassimon et al., 2009 and Cassimon et al., 
2008). Akin to the latest swap initiatives in the health and education sector, debt -for-nature 
swaps  now  typically  target  low -  and  middle-income  non-HIPC-eligible  countries  and  non-
HIPC/MDRI-eligible debt titles. As highlighted above, the main advocate is the United States, 
initiating 13 such operations with 12 different debtor countries under the TFCA between 2000 
and 2007. Environmental groups such as The Nature Conservancy , World Wildlife Fund and 
Conservation International have often subsidised part of the debt relief granted by the United 
States to these countries (see Sheikh, 2008; USAID, 2009b). Other creditor countries, such as 
Germany and France, for example, have also pursued new debt-for-nature initiatives (Buckley, 
2009; Viltz, 2008).  
                                                 
6 A further example comes from a transition economy. The Polish EcoFund, established by five Paris Club 
members in 1991, agreed to cancel debt claims in exchange for US$ 474 million in local currency funds 
disbursed until 2010 for environmental projects on air and water pollution, greenhouse gas emissions and 
biodiversity. The United States was by far the largest donor in this initiative, forgiving 10 percent of its 
bilateral debt in exchange for Polish counterpart contributions of US$ 370 million (OECD, 1998). 
 
7 The HIPC Initiative, launched in 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank, aimed to make a selected number 
of severely indebted low-income developing countries’ debt service payments realistic and achievable, and 
debt burdens sustainable. Creditors were asked to contribute debt relief in proportion to their volume of 
debt claims. The Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 1999 relaxed eligibility and progress criteria and introduced 
process conditionality through Poverty Reduction Strategies, instead of policy conditionality associated 
with pricist and state minimalist structural adjustment loans of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 2005, the 
IMF, World Bank and African Development Fund, through the MDRI, committed themselves to debt relief 
beyond HIPC, promising to forgive all remaining debt owed to them by countries that completed the whole 
HIPC process. To date, HIPC debt reduction packages have been endorsed for 35 countries, good for an 
estimated US$ 51 billion of nominal debt service relief over time (IMF, 2009a; World Bank-IEG, 2006). 
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The case under examination here is the recent American debt-for-nature swap with 
Indonesia, representing the 15
th and single largest swap under the TFCA so far (see USAID, 
2009a; Huff, 2009). The swap, signed on the 30
th June 2009, involves four main actors: the US 
government,  the  Indonesian  government,  Conservation  International,  and  an  Indonesian 
environmental foundation – Yayasan Keanekaragaman Hayati Indonesia (hereafter abbreviated 
as KEHATI).  
 
The US government has agreed to forgive six debt claims (all foreign assistance 
loans  from  1974-76)  owed  by  Indonesia  to  the  US  Agency  for  International  Development 
(USAID) in exchange for a pledge to spend an equivalent amount on grants to support local 
NGOs involved in tropical forest conservation projects in Sumatra (which is extremely rich in 
biodiversity). The outstanding principal and interest payments of US$ 29,921,500.22 (as of the 
15
th May 2009) have been forgiven for a commitment to deposit instalments for an identical sum 
(also  denominated  in  US$)  into  a  Debt  Service  Account  with  HSBC  in  Singapore 
(Garbaliauskas,  2009).  Through  the  TFCA,  USAID  receives  US$  20  million  from  the  US 
Treasury, and US$ 1 million each from Conservation International and KEHATI for the costs 
incurred in relieving the Indonesian Government from its obligations. The remaining US$ 7.9 
million of claims against Indonesia is borne by USAID itself.   
 
In accordance with instructions from an oversight committee, the depository of the 
Debt Service Account, HSBC, will make periodical transfer payments (denominated in US$ or 
Indonesian Rupiah) to a Forest Conservation Agreement (FCA) Grants Account. In response to 
calls for proposals, the administrator of this account, initially KEHATI, will then disburse grants 
to eligible environmental NGOs operating in tropical forest areas in Sumatra after proposals are 
approved by the oversight committee (US Government and Government of Indonesia, 2009). 
This set of transactions is illustrated in Figure 1.  
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(1) Under the TFCA, the US Treasury contributes US$ 20 million to USAID. In addition, Conservation International and 
KEHATI each pay a swap fee of US$ 1 million to USAID. 
(2) The US Government cancels six debt claims, with a nominal value of US$ 29,921,500.22, owed by the Indonesian 
Government to USAID. 
(3) The Indonesian Government pays in instalments the sum of US$ 29,921,500.22 into a Debt Service Account. 
(4) In accordance with instructions from an oversight committee, the depository of the Debt Service Account (HSBC) 
makes periodical transfers, denominated in US$ or Indonesian Rupiah, to a FCA Grants Account. 
(5) After approval by the oversight committee, the administrator of the FCA Grants Account (KEHATI) disburses grants 
to eligible NGOs to execute environmental projects. 
 
Source: Authors’ representation on the basis of US Government and Government of Indonesia (2009). 
 
 
We  now  assess  the  extent  to  which  this  debt-for-nature  swap  overcomes  the 
generic  shortcomings  of  this  type  of  financial  transaction,  starting  with  two  alleged  direct 
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3.   DIRECT BENEFITS 
 
3.1.   Increase in available resources to the debtor country 
 
Debt-for-nature swaps are supposed to increase net financial transfers to recipient 
countries. Through a swap a debtor government is able to divert public resources, otherwise 
leaving the country via debt service payments in foreign currency, to domestic spending on 
environmental  concerns.  In  other  words,  debt  swaps,  as  any  other  form  of  aid  intervention, 
transfer international purchasing power. Moreover, they are said to generate additional ‘fiscal 
space’  in  the  recipient  country’s  budget,  which  that  country  can  spend  without  putting  the 
stability  of its fiscal and  macro-economic position  at risk (Heller, 2005).  However, there  are 
three good reasons why this does not always occur.  
 
First, there may be a conflict between the timing of annual savings from debt relief 
and the timing of domestic counterpart payments. Debt relief savings are realised gradually, 
typically over many years or even decades, depending on the contractual repayment terms and 
schedule  of  the  underlying  debt.  In  contrast,  domestic  counterpart  payments  are  often 
frontloaded,  becoming  due  within  a  shorter  time  period.  A  poorly  structured  debt-for-nature 
swap where annual domestic counterpart payments occur prior to the realisation of debt relief 
savings may therefore worsen the government’s fiscal position instead of improving it. In this 
respect, the reported nominal value of the cancelled debt in a swap is not necessarily a reliable 
measure of the budgetary gains a swap can create. The net present value (NPV) of future debt 
service payments and counterparts payments is arguably a better estimator (in other words, the 
sum of annual net flows discounted at the interest rate at which the debtor country can raise this 
money on domestic markets). In particular when debt is highly concessional, with long maturity 
and repayment periods and below-market interest rates, as is the case with claims accounted 
for  as  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA),  NPV  gains  will  be  significantly  lower  than 
nominal ones. 
 
Second, and more importantly, only the share of debt service that would have been 
actually paid to the creditor in the absence of debt relief will generate true fiscal space. To 
presuppose that all debts would have been fully serviced without the swap arrangement (in 
other words, assuming the probability of default to be zero) is clearly optimistic, especially when 
a  country  is  experiencing  debt  service  problems.  This  is  especially  the  case  since  credit 
availability has tightened after the global financial crisis. If the debtor would have failed to meet 
its debt obligations, the resource effect of debt reduction through swap practices is partly virtual, 
referring to an ‘accounting clean-up of historical and future arrears accumulation’ (Cassimon 
and Vaessen, 2007). 
 
Third, debt-for-nature swaps are often based on the tacit assumption that these 
interventions are additional to other forms of donor support (especially when swaps concern 
countries and debt titles outside the HIPC/MDRI framework). However, debt-for-nature swaps 
may well crowd out other, potentially more effective, forms of aid (as accounting rules allow 
donors to treat debt relief operations as substitutes for new aid). Most notably, the full nominal 
value  of  debt  relief  is  counted  as  ODA,  the  primary  benchmark  used  by  the  Development  
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Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to determine donor disbursements.
8 In this respect, 
debt-for-nature swaps can be considered an attractive option to boost a donor’s ODA figures, 
and  may  lead  to  reduced  expenditures  on  other  categories  of  ODA.  Moreover,  since  the 
nominal value of debt-for-nature operations is typically an overestimation of both the debtor’s 
benefit and the creditor’s cost, a swap may provide fewer resources than, say, direct budget 
support.  Evidence  from  empirical  studies  suggests  that  past  debt  swaps  have  not  been 
additional to other sources of donor financing (Birdsall et al., 2003; Ndikumana, 2004). 
 
The foregoing suggests that debt-for-nature swaps which seem generous at first 
sight may only lead to minor hard currency as well as budgetary gains for the recipient country. 
Indeed, debt relief from the first generation of debt swap initiatives, in which debt-for-nature 
swaps  occupied  an  important  role,  was  indeed  largely  fictitious  in  fiscal  terms  (see  e.g. 
Krugman, 1988;  Bulow and Rogoff, 1991). And  if counterpart payments are large and early 
compared  to  the  expected  debt  service  savings,  or  the  operation  crowds  out  other  aid 
interventions,  debt  swaps,  unlike  straight  donations,  can  even  lead  to  lower  net  financial 
transfers, and cause fiscal space to shrink (Occhiolini, 1990).
9  
 
The case under review does not perform consistently across these thr ee issues. 
On the one hand, as the original debt service schedule has been adopted for the deposit of 
counterpart instalments into the Debt Service Account, there is no conflict between the timing of 
annual savings and counterpart payments.  However, on th e other hand, no fiscal space has 
been created as the entire previous outstanding principal and interest sums are still due (now 
going into the Debt Service Account instead of to USAID) without any positive discount. Neither 
has there been any hard currenc y relief since payments remain US$ denoted. As such, no 
transfer of international purchasing power occurs. In sum, the swap does not appear to be 
generating additional resources for the Government of Indonesia.  
 
Turning to the second issue, as Indonesia i s labelled as a non-HIPC country and 
has serviced all of its external debt, the probability of non-full debt repayment appears relatively 
small. It is important to note, however, that Indonesia enjoyed Paris club debt rescheduling on 
concessional Houston terms for lower middle-income countries in 2000 and again in 2002 (Paris 
Club, 2009b). This suggests some previous debt service problems which may have been 
prevented by rescheduling arrangements. In this respect, the possibility of default cannot be 
discarded entirely.  
 
Finally, it is difficult to gauge the effect of the US -Indonesian swap on other US 
donor support. Since the Federal Credit Reform was passed in 1990, the US Treasury is 
obliged to make appropriations to fund debt -for-nature transactions with official public debt, 
covering  the  estimated  NPV  costs  of  the  interest  and  principal  payments  foregone.  For 
example, under the TFCA, appropriations have added up to US$ 117 million from 2000 to 2006 
(Sheikh, 2008). It is however unclear how much of the U S$ 20 million contribution to USAID is 
deducted from the US development aid budget. In view of the aforementioned ODA accounting 
                                                 
8 To avoid double counting, this is not the case for debt titles that refer to donor support which already 
previously qualified as ODA. 
 
9 This is not to say that replacing debt service in hard currency with local currency counterpart payments 
does not provide some benefit if the debtor country is suffering from severe foreign exchanges shortages 
(Deacon and Murphy, 1997).  
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rules, the absence of additionality could arguably be taken as the default. The burden of proving 
additionality falls on the donor institutions that claim it. 
 
 
3.2.  Increase in available resources for conservation  
 
In addition to providing additional financial resources to the debtor country, it is 
often asserted that debt-for-nature swaps create further immediate benefits: not for the nation in 
question, but for global level public goods support through an increase in resources for the 
conservation of forests (and thus carbon sequestration and reduced carbon emissions) and, to 
a lesser extent these days, biodiversity. Clearly, the embedded ‘earmarking’ of debt savings 
towards conservation would suggest this. The alleged increase in overall funds for conservation 
purposes,  however,  depends  on  additionality  in  both  donor  support  and  government 
expenditure in this area. These are now discussed in turn. 
 
First of all, and related to the third argument of section 3.1, at the donor level, debt-
for-nature swaps may well substitute for other interventions aimed at conservation, and as such 
they may not be additional. 
  
Second, and in a similar vein, debt-for-nature swaps do not automatically result in 
additional resources spent on conservation purposes within recipient countries (Hansen, 1989). 
When confronted with a schedule of counterpart payments, government may decide to cut back 
on  their  own  efforts  and  reduce  projected  budget  allocations  for  conservation  spending.  A 
certain degree of so-called ‘fungibility’ is inherent to most aid instruments, but often thought to 
be more pronounced in the case of specifically targeted support such as debt-for-nature swaps 
(Feyzioglu et al., 1998).  
 
A  significant  degree  of  additionality  in  a  double  sense,  with  freed-up  resources 
coming on top of other donor interventions as well as budget lines already reserved by the 
recipient for conservation goals, should be a necessary condition for the enactment of debt-for-
nature  swaps.  So,  how  does  our  Indonesian  case  perform  against  these  two  additionality 
requirements? 
 
It is again difficult to gauge the degree of additionality of the US-Indonesian swap 
to overall US donor support for conservation. To our knowledge, there is also no systemised 
data available on to what extent recent debt-for-nature swaps, including our case study, were 
subject  to  fungibility.  Measuring  debtor  country  spending  on  the  environment  against  an 
historical  baseline  may  possibly  provide  some  insights  here.  The  Forest  Conservation 
Agreement    between  Indonesia,  Conservation  international  and  KEHATI  states  that  grant 
proposals  for  conservation  projects  that  target  tropical  forest  sites  whose  species  and 
ecosystems  differ  from  those  already  managed  under  the  national  system  of  classified 
Protected Areas
10 will be prioritised, hinting at some degree of additionality to Indonesia’s own 
conservation efforts. This ‘complementarity’ criterion is however only one out of five grounds for 
prioritisation  and  moreover  no  necessary  condition  for  project  selection  (Government  of 
Indonesia, CI and KEHATI, 2009). Overall, it has been hard to assess donor additionality and 
government fungibility. Involved parties could well be able to provide further details.  
                                                 
10 See e.g. NISP (2006) for more information on this Protected Area system and its financing modalities.  
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4.   INDIRECT BENEFITS 
 
Unlike other aid interventions, debt-for-nature swap may possibly have extra (more 
indirect) benefits through helping recipient countries to surmount a ‘debt overhang’ (see e.g. 
Krugman, 1988). High debt service payments in a highly indebted country precipitate, or are 
expected to lead to, punitive taxation against the most productive sectors of the economy, thus 
reducing investment, economic stability, lowering government revenues, and, finally, the ability 
to  meet  debt  service  payments  (Cassimon  et  al.,  2008;  Occhiolini,  1990).
11  Debt  relief 
interventions, such as debt-for-nature swaps, could help to break this vicious circle  and restore 
a self-enforcing process of economic stabili ty. This will then in turn lead to greater domestic 
resource mobilisation in the future (for example through more efficient taxing practices or 
increased private sector investment). Lowering debt burdens could also alter the distribution of 
aid flows in a positive manner. Indeed, over the years bilateral donors have tended to provide 
the most-indebted countries with new loans to allow them to stay current on their debt service 
payments, rather than using these funds for development purposes in less -indebted countries 
with often higher-quality policy choices (a practice that has been termed ‘defensive lending’ - 
see e.g. Birdsall et al., 2003). Debt relief would reduce the need for such defensive lending and 
allow recipient countries to attract more aid as donors aim to increase overall aid effectiveness 
by channelling funds to countries where the poverty elasticity of aid is greater. Another indirect 
benefit of lower (hard currency) indebtedness in developing countries might be the reduced 
need for primary resource exports and therefore lower extraction and deforestation rates.
12 
 
However, debt relief must reach a critical mass and be delivered in a harmonised 
manner to stand a chance in freeing a country from its debt burden  and the related economic 
deadlock. In contrast, debt-for-nature swaps have always been piecemeal interventions whose 
scale, in comparison with recipient countries’ overall debt stock, is deemed insufficient to make 
a meaningful impact (see e.g. Hamlin, 1989; Hansen, 1989; Patterson, 1990; Thapa, 1998).
13 
That  only  a  ‘discrete  shock’  under  the  form  of  sizeable  and  comprehensive  debt  relief 
operations (Bulow and Rogoff, 1991) can address a situation of ‘debt overhang’ has led to the 
gradual demise of earlier debt swaps and paved the way for large-scale initiatives such as HIPC 
and the prior Brady initiative for middle-income countries.
14 For reasons of limited size, typical 
debt for-nature swaps have no real potential of garnering more domestic resources in the future, 
improving aid allocation or bringing down deforestation rates in recipient countries. 
 
So, how does our Indonesian case compare here? Despite being the largest debt -
for-nature swap yet conducted under the TFCA, the US$ 30 million nominal value pales into 
insignificance when compared with Indonesia’s total outstanding debt of US$ 149.7 billion in 
                                                 
11 This is not to say that the ‘debt overhang’ hypothesis is not contentious. For example, Chauvin and 
Kraay (2005) dispute that the hypothesis holds for low-income countries. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence that middle-income countries do suffer such effects from excessive debt burdens (see Patillo et 
al., 2004). For the specific case of Indonesia, Cholifihani (2008) suggests that debt overhang is a long-
term rather than short-term problem. 
  
12 See footnote 2 on the ‘double dividend hypothesis’. 
 
13 The Polish EcoFund swap is a notable exception. 
  
14 The Brady debt reduction deals between 1989 and 1995 helped mostly Latin American countries swap 
syndicated debt held by private creditors for bonds with lower nominal value and/or reduced interest rates. 
These transactions typically involved several hundreds of millions of US$ per country and have been said 
to have deterred debt overhang, at least to some extent (Arslanalp and Henry, 2005).  
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nominal value in 2008, equal to 29.3% of GDP and 96.7% of exports in 2008 (IMF, 2009b). In 
other words, the swap only concerns 0.02% of Indonesian debt (in nominal terms) and can not 
be expected to sort any (indirect) effects on Indonesia’s economic position. The total absence of 
hard  currency  relief  further  implies  that  deforestation  rates  could  not  have  been  affected. 
Moreover, Indonesia’s latest debt sustainability analysis (IMF, 2009b) suggests that the country 
has steadily improved both its external and total (external and domestic) public debt position 
over  the  last  decade.  Nevertheless,  in  recent  years,  domestic  public  debt  has  become  the 
biggest threat in Indonesia (World Bank, 2007), a trend observed in many other (middle-income) 
developing economies (Panizza, 2008).  
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5.  ALIGNMENT WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SYSTEMS 
 
Granting debt relief is very similar to providing budget support, to the extent that 
both modalities free up additional budgetary resources for the recipient. As it is of course not 
necessarily the case that these extra funds will be put to good development use, donors have 
tended to curtail recipient countries’ choice by controlling to a certain degree the ways in which 
the resources will be spent. Just as conditionality on ‘new’ concessional lending has shifted 
from policies (such as stipulating specific public sector reforms) towards supporting processes 
(such  as  the  completion  of  a  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Paper  or  PRSP),  the  conditions 
attached to debt relief have evolved.  
 
The previous approach has been to give binding instructions on the allocation of 
funds, referred to as ‘earmarking’ in donor jargon.  Different types of ‘earmarking’ exist (see e.g. 
IMF and IDA, 2001) and donor practice has changed through time. For example, many donors 
now  seek  to  influence  recipient  government  behaviour  through  policy  dialogue  on  fiscal 
prudence, good governance and respect for human rights (see e.g. Mold, 2009).  
 
Unsurprisingly, debt swaps implemented during the 1980s and 1990s, including 
debt-for-nature swaps, often practiced ‘micro-earmarking’, with donors attempting to keep track 
of the use of freed-up resources. To accomplish this, counterpart payments were established 
outside  recipient  countries’  regular  budgets  jointly  managed  by  donor,  debtor  and,  in  some 
cases, NGO brokers. Donors also imposed mechanisms for implementation, and monitoring 
and evaluation, which circumvented the recipient’s established system (see Roemer, 1989).  
 
Whilst micro-earmarking allowed donors to keep an eye on how debt relief was 
utilised (thus increasing accountability to constituencies at home), such surveillance increases 
the  chances  of  the  displacement  of  domestic  resources  to  other  budget  priorities  (in  other 
words,  fungibility).  Moreover,  the  creation  of  parallel  systems  suffers  from  high  transaction 
costs, prevents long-term capacity building, and reduces the sense of national ownership (and 
hence, perhaps, the longevity of such practices). Donors now claim to leave the allocation of 
funds, planning, budgeting, implementation of projects and programmes, and monitoring and 
evaluation processes in the hands of the recipient government. At the same time, they try to use 
their influence to gradually improve public sector functioning and, along with other stakeholders, 
engage  government  in  dialogue  on  key  national  development  issues  (see  Molenaers  and 
Renard, 2009).   
 
Indeed,  debt  relief  practice  has  been  at  the  forefront  of  this  evolution  in 
donor/government relations, as evidenced by the use of Poverty Reduction Strategies in the 
enhanced HIPC Initiative.
15 As such, most debt relief practice has evolved to what one can 
denote as ‘debt-to-PRSP swaps’ (Cassimon and Vaessen, 2007:24). 
 
In  recent  years,  this  new  aid  delivery  paradigm  has  been  further  elaborated, 
resulting in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for 
Action.  In  Paris  and  Accra,  bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  subscribed,  inter  alia,  to  the 
concepts  of  ‘policy  alignment’  and  ‘system  alignment’  (see  OECD-DAC,  2005,  2008).  The 
                                                 
15 Since 1999, the preparation of a PRSP is a precondition to qualify for debt relief under the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative and gain access to new concessional IMF/World bank loans (see IMF, 2009c).  
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former refers to focusing donor support on partner countries’ national development strategies, 
whereas the latter encourages the use of countries’ own institutions and public systems  for 
financial  management,  implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation  where  these  are  deemed 
effective, accountable and transparent. But to what extent do debt-for-nature swaps adhere to 
the ‘principles’ of ‘policy alignment’ and ‘system alignment’?  
 
 
5.1.   Policy alignment 
 
On policy alignment, there are two key questions: first, ownership and control of 
conservation measures; and second, coherence with the environmental (and developmental) 
strategy of the country. 
 
The strong involvement of international NGOs in the first generation of (primarily 
private)  swaps  raises  questions  about  the  recipient  government  control  in  such  initiatives. 
Although  typical  debt-for-nature  contracts  required  NGO  projects  to  be  consistent  with 
government policies, host government involvement was generally limited to veto rights on the 
projects proposed (see Deacon and Murphy, 1997). Often there was no room for governments 
to actively define programmes and/or projects according to their own national development or 
sectoral priorities. Unsurprisingly, within Latin American countries such schemes were criticised 
as  being  forms  of  ‘eco-imperialism’  or  ‘eco-colonialism’  (see  Greener,  1991;  Gugler,  1997). 
Swaps involving public debt have also suffered from a lack of debtor government control on 
environmental measures (see Jha and Schatan, 2001).  
 
The  most  influential  body  in  the  US-Indonesian  debt  swap  procedure  is  the 
oversight committee. This is responsible for, among other tasks, the establishment of a strategic 
plan with key conservation objectives, the final approval of eligible grant recipients and their 
proposals,  the  supervision  of  all  payment  transfers  between  the  different  accounts  and  the 
annual evaluation under the TFCA. Clearly, the composition of the oversight committee is of the 
utmost importance. We find that only one Indonesian Government official can be a permanent 
voting  member  of  this  decision-making  body.  The  other  three  permanent  members  are 
designees of the US Government, Conservation International and  KEHATI. Three additional 
oversight committee members are nominated by designated environmental NGOs of, or active 
in, Indonesia (Government of Indonesia, CI and KEHATI, 2009). In other words, control of the 
debt  swap  conservation  measures  is  largely  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Indonesian 
Government  and  transferred  to  non-governmental  (and  sometimes  non-Indonesian)  actors. 
Such a structure could raise questions regarding national ownership and could endanger the 
longevity of these measures. 
 
We now turn to coherence with environmental (and developmental) strategy of the 
country. We focus firstly on a recent environmental strategy document from Indonesia  - the 
National  Action  Plan  Addressing  Climate  Change.  In  this  document,  Indonesia’s  Ministry  of 
Environment sets out mitigation and adaptation strategies in response to climate change and 
calls upon bilateral and multilateral partnerships to tackle the environmental problems faced. 
Deforestation,  especially  in  Sumatra,  is  given  considerable  attention.  Moreover,  within  the 
mitigation  and  adaptation  strategies  outlined,  the  protection  and  management  of  forest 
ecosystems  and  prevention  of  illegal  logging  and  reforestation  are  recurrent  themes.  Debt 
swaps  are  one  of  the  non-conventional  financing  instruments  deemed  desirable  here  
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(Government of Indonesia, 2007). Therefore, there seems to be a reasonable fit between the 




More importantly, and in sharp contrast with most developing c ountries, Indonesia 
has made noticeable efforts to mainstream broader environmental matters into its development 
agenda.
17 Recognising the interrelationship between climate change control, economic growth 
and  poverty  reduction,  Indonesia’s  national  planning  agency  or  Badan  Perencanaan  dan 
Pembangunan  Nasional  (BAPPENAS)  has  produced  the  National  Development  Planning 
Response to Climate Change or ‘Yellow Book’ which explicitly attempts to integrate the above-
mentioned National Action Plan into the 2010-2014 National Mid-Term Development Plan (see 
Tedjakusuma, 2009; Indrawati, 2008). The issuance of this Yellow Book points at the central 
role climate change mitigation/adaptation, and thus by extension the conservation of tropical 
forests,  occupies  in  Indonesia’s  overall  national  development  strategy.  Again,  debt  swaps 
feature prominently on BAPPENAS’s priority list of climate finance mechanisms (see Triastuti, 
2008; Indrawati, 2008).  
 
Further evidence of the inclusion of climate change within Indonesia’s development 
planning processes comes from the OECD’s Aid Architecture and Financing Unit (see OECD, 
2009). This highlights how Indonesia is a leading example of policy integration. For example, 
and in a similar manner to Bangladesh, the country has created a Climate Change Trust Fund 
to allow global public resources to be delivered ‘horizontally’ to relevant Ministries.
18 Overall, 
there appears to be ample policy coherence between Indonesia’s developmental strategies and 
the recent debt swap. 
 
 
5.2.  System alignment 
 
System alignment, or in other words working with the recipient country’s systems 
and procedures to the maximum extent possible, is crucial for long-term capacity building and 
strengthening  of  public  sector  agencies  active  in  environmental  affairs.  Previous  studies  on 
debt-for-nature swaps have paid little attention to the concept of system alignment. However, as 
international  NGOs  have  brokered  a  number  of  deals,  it  is  likely  that  parallel  budget, 
implementation,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems  have  been  utilised  (not  least  as  an 
international  NGO  may  require  a  degree  of  oversight  not  possible  within  government 
procedures).  As  a  result,  opportunities  to  make  government  agencies  more  effective  and 
develop the experience and skills of their personnel have been foregone (Patterson, 1990). For 
example,  Gugler  (1997)  indicates  that,  in  many  cases,  new  financially  autonomous 
environmental funds or foundations have been established in parallel to existing structures. 
 
                                                 
16 See USAID (2009a) and Government of Indonesia, CI and KEHATI (2009), respectively, for detailed 
lists of these eligible activities. 
 
17 Prowse et al. (2009) note that contrary to the prominence of climate change on the international policy 
agenda, many national development plans, such as Poverty Reduc tion Strategy Papers and equivalent 
National Development Strategies, ignore climate change and wider environmental concerns. 
  
18 Whilst the Climate Change Trust Fund demonstrates how the debt swap is aligned with national policy, 
it also illustrates how it has no system alignment for the debt swap is entirely outside this funding basket.   
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Our Indonesian case is clearly no exception to this. The ringfencing arrangements 
made  for  the  use  of  the  debt  swap  proceeds,  namely  the  Debt  Service  and  FCA  Grants 
Accounts, largely bypass the Indonesian Government’s institutions and public systems. In Paris 
Declaration terms, a so-called Parallel Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was created (OECD-
DAC, 2005), resulting in a duplication of costs. Indeed, extra management expenses incurred 
by the administrator need to be approved by the oversight committee and are paid from the 
Debt Service Account, thereby diminishing the sum available for project grants. 
 
To  be  eligible  for  grants  under  the  debt-for-nature  swap  deal,  candidate 
organisations need to be operating and/or established in Indonesia and can not be affiliated with 
the administrator, depository, Indonesian Government, Conservation International, KEHATI or a 
designated  member  institution.  Once  selected,  grant  recipients  are  obliged,  at  their  own 
expense,  to  keep  accurate  accounts  and  present  complete  annual  financial  statements  in 
accordance with a set of agreed upon principles and standards. Moreover, a detailed narrative 
report on progress towards the goals set forth in the original grant proposal and a certification 
by an independent auditor need to be submitted (Government of Indonesia, CI and KEHATI, 
2009). While the focus on local conservation actors can be considered positive, the extensive 
reporting requirements may arguably deter those (low-capacity) organisations that would benefit 
most from being involved in the implementation of projects financed by the swap. Overall, the 
project and proposal based funding structure is likely to impact considerable transaction costs, 
possibly leading to a lack of predictability and longevity of funding.  
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 6.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
With climate change an ever more important item on the international agenda, the 
importance of forests as carbon sinks, extractors of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and a 
primary  source  of  biodiversity  is  only  set  to  increase.  Schemes  to  reduce  emission  from 
deforestation and support forest conservation efforts (such as REDD-plus), and their integration 
into a global climate regime, have been recently discussed at various occasions. The financing 
modalities  of  such  schemes  remain  however  undecided.  All  this  appears  to  have  renewed 
interest  in  debt-for-nature  swaps,  a  possible  source  of  financing  included  in  negotiation 
documents  at  Bonn  and  Copenhagen.  The  re-emergence  of  such  swaps  poses  serious 
questions as to the extent to which practice has incorporated the insights of earlier critiques. As 
has  been  demonstrated  in  this  article,  the  US-Indonesian  debt-for-nature  deal,  which  we 
consider  as  a  litmus  test  for  current  swap  practice,  performs  unevenly  across  five  typical 
shortcomings.  
 
First,  adopting  the  original  debt  service  schedule  (with  timing  and  instalments 
staying the same as before) means that this debt swap does not destroy the fiscal space of the 
Indonesian Government. But neither does it create fiscal space. The Government of Indonesia 
is still liable for the entire previous outstanding principle and interest sums and does not enjoy 
any positive discount.  
 
Second, from the documents and data we have been able to assemble it remains 
unclear  whether  the  freed-up  resources  come  on  top  of  other  donor  support  and  reserved 
domestic budget lines for conservation goals. It is difficult for outside researchers to assess 
‘double additionality’ and involved parties may be able to provide further details on this issue.  
 
Third, relative to Indonesia’s total debt burden, a US$ 30 million debt swap is too 
insignificant  to  create  any  indirect  (positive)  economic  effect.  One  cannot  expect  the  debt 
scenario to benefit from this piecemeal transaction, especially as domestic debt is outpacing 
external debt in Indonesia.  
 
The swap’s performance with respect to the new aid delivery paradigm’s emphasis 
on  alignment  with  government  policy  and  systems  is  also  mixed.  Fourth,  policy  coherence 
between  the  aims  of  the  debt-for-nature  swap  and  Indonesia’s  own  environmental  and 
developmental priorities seems to have been respected. But, fifth and finally, the two accounts 
and  the decision-making structures (the  oversight committee) handling the swap have been 
established  in  parallel  to  existing  (government)  structures  and  separate  (strict)  reporting 
requirements have been put in place. Such practice undercuts ownership and sustainability and 
augments transaction costs. 
 
While it is possible (in theory) to make debt-for-nature swaps more efficient and 
effective instruments by engineering them in such a way that they adhere to the basic principles 
of fiscal space, double additionality and policy and system alignment, the scaling up of these 
instruments remains a major problem. Large-scale debt relief schemes similar to HIPC/MDRI 
but  earmarked  to  conservation/  climate  purposes  are  not  feasible.  Nearly  all  bilateral  and 
multilateral debt owed by HIPC countries is due to be cancelled when these countries reach 
their completion point under the HIPC process. Only those bilateral and multilateral debt titles 
that rest  with a  limited  number of non-HIPC low-income and lower middle-income countries  
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(such  as  Indonesia)  seem  realistically  qualified  for  new  debt-for-nature  initiatives  (see 
Development  Finance  International,  2009).  These  debt  titles  are,  however,  not  immediately 
accessible, as vertical funds such as the Global Fund (through its Debt2Health programme) in 
the  health  sector  and  an  envisaged  EduFund  or  Debt4Education  initiative  in  the  education 
sector (see e.g. Filmus and Serrani, 2009) are expected to focus on the same claims. Many 
actors seem to be fishing in the same pond and for their own purposes. A second wave of debt-
for-nature swaps thus appears to be neither practicable nor desirable. 
 
This is not to say that the concept behind debt-for-nature should be abandoned all 
together. Indeed, as the climate crisis is beginning to unfold, there is a need to debate broader 
initiatives that link debt service payments to climate change mitigation/adaptation, and to forest 
conservation efforts specifically. Rather than attempting to sidestep best practices, a promising 
approach  might  be  to  mainstream  environmental  concerns  into  the  existing  HIPC/MDRI 
framework, raising policymakers’ awareness and aiding developing countries to take fully into 
account  climate  change  issues  when  formulating  their  national  development  strategies  (see 
Prowse et al., 2009). Indonesia arguably stands as an exemplar in this respect.  
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